“A difficult year will be followed by an even more difficult one”

Interview to Kosovo’s Epoka e Re, focused on the latest events in The Hague and the Special Chambers, the strategic failures in the dialogue and diplomacy — and what awaits us next year.

Epoka e Re: Mr. Selimi, these days you have had several reactions on your social network X (formerly Twitter) about the events in The Hague, including the raids that have been conducted on journalists and collaborators of the former President Thaçi, where you criticized the Special Court. Do you think these raids have political motives?

Selimi: The raids have been very strange, to put it mildly. For example, it is absolutely revolting when an intellectual and political activist like Blerim Shala, author, writer, journalist, and active participant in all the key progressive political processes of Kosovo since the 1980s to the present, who is also presently advising the Kurti Government on the dialogue process, has his phone confiscated. Does anyone seriously think that Blerim Shala is intimidating witnesses? Or Ismail Syla, an advisor to President Thaçi who is also a writer and poet, and who has spent years as a political prisoner of the communist dictatorship, how is it possible for special prosecutors to block his family home an entire day?

The wiretaps’ transcripts that were used by the court as justification are also disgusting and endanger the rights of the accused. One could read some free conversations about the process by the accused who have been closed off for three years, with respective visitors, nothing more. Why aren’t they also publishing the prosecution’s transcripts with tempting offers to witnesses, or even the cases where it has been proven beyond any doubt that the witnesses were influenced and paid by Serbian intelligence services. A total circus, but not at all a funny one.

Epoka e Re: Some voices, including Prime Minister Kurti himself, say that Thaçi and others are to blame because they themselves founded the court that is now trying them?

Selimi: The founding of the Special Court was not a separate act but a process, where the West, and especially the administration of President Obama, presented Kosovo with two options: either Kosovo establishes this institution within the framework of its own Constitution to cleanse the KLA from accusations of organ trafficking, or this tribunal would be established by the UN, under the mandate of Resolution 1244, which would return Kosovo to a protectorate, at least in terms of the rule of law.

President Thaçi and the absolute majority of the Assembly of Kosovo, even though it was known that the price could be high and might end with the arrest of the KLA leaders themselves, made this sacrifice for the sake of Kosovo.

Such a personal sacrifice and a political price, we have not seen from the current leadership to ever make on any topic where Kosovo benefits, which is why they criticize so easily.

Did the Assembly make a mistake in voting for this Court at the time? From today’s perspective, it might be so, now when we see procedural negligence, moral betrayal, and the wasted time for prisoners who remained innocent without a single day of trial for some years in prison, as well as the prosecutor’s narrative entirely based on Serbian theories of moral relativism of the Kosovo war.

The assessment of decisions cannot be made with the hindsight we have today, but with what was known 10 years ago. Yet, we must be critical of the degradation of the original idea of cleansing from the false accusations of organs, into a grotesque chimera of political persecution and quasi-legal processes, and demand responsibility and an exit strategy from the Court itself and our allies from this unamusing circus that is damaging justice in Kosovo.

Epoka e Re: The departure of the KLA leaders to The Hague coincided with the coming of the new government, specifically the two Kurti I and Kurti II governments. How do you assess the situation today with regard to Kosovo’s diplomatic position?

Kosovo has lost quite a bit of time in recent years. The world is changing dramatically, with major conflicts and clashes between states and perhaps even civilizations. We were on a journey to conclude the open chapters of Kosovo in our relations with Serbia — a process that Serbia absolutely wanted to delay, to maintain the status quo, and unfortunately, in recent years, in many respects, some have managed to fulfill Serbia’s wish.

We fell out with America. We fell out with the EU. We fell out with Albania. Let’s not forget, Kosovo today is the only country in all of Europe, after Russia and Belarus, that has sanctions from the West.

The KSF was excluded from NATO military exercises. Our embassies and our diplomacy are completely isolated and have lost influence in Washington and Brussels. These are empirical facts and not subjective opinions. At long last, the Government, in an “evening bazaar” [Aksham Pazar, where sales are cheap], accepted a secret status for the association, the famous “Zajednica” for which when it was in opposition it spilled blood, used violence, threw bombs and grenades, and declared traitors left and right.

Epoka e Re: Do you believe the government is making a mistake by accepting the association?

Selimi: The association, or the right of municipalities to connect horizontally in non-executive processes, was also in Kai Eide’s report in 2005 and in the Ahtisaari Plan in 2007. Therefore, creating an association is not something we accept or refuse because it is a constitutional right of the municipalities.

The concept built during past governments, fully supported in writing by our allies, was that an association in accordance with the Constitution of Kosovo should be created as an element in achieving the final, legally binding agreement, centered on mutual recognition between Kosovo and Serbia.

But we have foolishly lost a lot of time and resources in recent years and allowed the geopolitical context to force a softening of the allies’ stance, and now this government is ready to accept an association without recognition and without any clear signal of when the final legally binding agreement will be reached. This agreement is not final, it must be said clearly. This agreement is allowing the endless continuation of negotiations.

Meanwhile, there is also a significant aspect of political, and perhaps moral, responsibility.

Wasn’t Kosovo public and the Kosovar leaders under the pressure of violence, tear gas, Molotov cocktails, rockets and grenades thrown in parliament, private yards, and private cars of ministers burned by then opposition VV, exactly because of the “zajednica”? Where is the political responsibility for the blood spilled on the streets of Kosovo if the same formula is now being accepted, with far less benefit for Kosovo?

Epoka e Re: So what is the option of the opposition? In the assembly, we have various voices, from the former Prime Minister Haradinaj who approves this last agreement in Brussels, to PDK deputies who oppose it, as well as LDK deputies who criticize this very agreement. Shouldn’t the opposition speak with one voice?

Selimi: Firstly, let me say that I cannot respond in any way on behalf of the opposition because I am neither in its organs nor in a position to call myself a representative of the opposition or even the PDK. I am a mere citizen, with a modest amount of experience from 7 years spent in diplomacy, and few more years in media and civil society.

And absolutely, I think the government deserves criticism for inconsistency. Past governments have accepted the association and today the criticism of Kurti is not about acceptance or not, but about the degradation of the process, extraordinary delays, blood spilled on the streets in past years, and the lack of clear diplomatic benefits for Kosovo. Kurti accepted “zajednica” that brings problems but does not bring recognition or any clear diplomatic benefit.

Therefore, the Kurti Government is at fault for a total lack of governing strategy. And not just in dialogue. Who knows today what the minister of education is doing, or the minister of health, or the economy? They have disappeared. Invisible. Voiceless. With an economy wrecked by the cost of living crisis and failures in the flow of investments from abroad and the execution of domestic investments. All of these are verifiable. The surplus from budget mismanagement reaches 700–800 million euros. Opposition municipalities do not receive capital investments from the center.

A total mismanagement of governance, but it’s not as if the opposition has capitalized on this obvious incompetence of the government. There is an unbearable calmness of the opposition, especially when there are reasons to be proud of the post-war achievements and especially after independence.

Epoka e Re: In the end, what awaits Kosovo in 2024?

This year was a difficult one, but I fear that next year will bring even more challenges. I do not see that there is any clear strategic aim to move swiftly forward while our allies are also focused on many crisis hotspots. We will also have elections in America and the European Union, which will slow developments on this side as well. Hopefully we are wrong, but the status quo seems to be a satisfactory state for our government.