Everything you wanted to know about the next elections in Kosovo but were afraid to ask.

Kosovo’s government of PM Kurti has entered its’ fourth year of governance. Increasing number of conversations are now focused towards the forthcoming national elections.

Back in 2021, a historic win in Kosovan elections was recorded by the improbable but effective big-tent coalition that coalesced around Kosovo’s perennial protester Albin Kurti and the former LDK Speaker of Parliament Vjosa Osmani. This coalition consisted of urban macchiato-sipping crowd, Islamist conservatives, ultra-nationalists unhappy with Brussels agreements and was also helped by a huge turnout in diaspora. VV and its junior partners thus managed to get unprecedented 51% of all votes. This was translated into 58 MPs (out of 100 Albanian MPs, as the 20 additional seats are reserved for minorities), a result that was supposedly improbable to get in a proportional electoral system.

It was truly a tsunami-type of elections, based on strong anti-establishment mood of the voters — but not unlike other countries in West where populist politicians became popular with voters tired of the three C’s: COVID, corruption and cost of living crisis.

Electoral landscape has changed in Kosovo since then.

Despite expectations that Kurti will wipe out the opposition in the subsequent local elections in the late 2021, an unexpected electoral correction was served by voters. Kurti lost all the cities it has previously won (including the. capital Prishtina and second biggest city Prizren) and barely scraped by a difference of few hundred votes, wins in only three out of 36 Kosovar municipalities.

Back in early 2021, Kurti managed to use its dramatic showdown with Trump administration by harnessing sympathies (some would say also anti-American sentiment) in several European countries as well as large sections of Kosovan public.

Last three years though, relationship with both EU and USA soured to the point of a complete breakdown in communication. Kosovo is currently the only country except Belarus and Russia, under EU sanctions (or “reversible measures”). Senior members of Biden administration and other key allies of Kosovo, have publicly rebuked present leadership in Prishtina for the lack of coordination, escalatory policies, failure to implement agreements. Kosovo currently has an incumbent Prime minister who is essentially not on speaking terms with Tirana, Brussels and Washington. Will this matter? Will Kurti’s (re)turn to identity politics, (re)ignite a voting public that is increasingly tired of politics and politicians?

Let’s cover key issues and challenges to consider that may have enormous impact on elections, but also entire architecture of peace and Euro-Atlantic integration in Western Balkans?

Date of elections

Regular elections should be held in early 2025. Opposition has requested early elections. There are different paths to early elections, none of them viable without Kurti’s explicit endorsement and vote. AAK has initiated a motion of no confidence but opposition doesn’t have the numbers to vote it through, triggering snap elections.

Other way is for Kurti to simply resign. As opposition doesn’t have numbers to propose a new PM, this would certainly trigger snap elections too, but the likelihood of Albin Kurti resigning from his post just to please opposition, is close to zero.

Third option is for the ruling party and the opposition to agree on dissolution of parliament. This was even proposed in somewhat unclear manner by Kurti himself in recent weeks, but then we come to second hurdle, agreeing on a date of elections. PDK wants early June, VV wants summer months to enable diaspora vote at home, LDK indicated autumn. Several stakeholders close to the government have indicated to foreign diplomats that October seems most likely date. One plausible explanation is that Kurti wants elections, hoping for a new mandate before potential return of President Trump in White House. Second reasoning is that government wants to conclude some major public investment works during the summer so it can show at least some concrete results in a mandate otherwise rather bereft of results in economy, investments or other issues unrelated to north and Serbia.

Candidates

The most exciting part of 2024/25 race are the candidates. Kurti is not a novelty voice of change anymore. He’s an incumbent with a track record in governance. Vjosa Osmani is not part of the race anymore aiding Kurti — as a President, she can’t campaign. Her own party “Guxo” never managed to get any traction in the public and rumors are that President Osmani’s relations with her successor, the volatile foreign minister Donika Gervalla Schwartz, are frayed.

Opposition has quickly shown some newfound oomph since the traumatic 2021 national elections, which is one reason why they demolished VV in the local elections.

PDK (2021 elections: 19 MP’s)

PDK’s head in Memli Krasniqi, a young(ish) former hip-hop star who has served many terms in the parliament and as a successful minister. The party had to tackle the shocking departure of the founders of the party (and the Republic) Hashim Thaci and Kadri Veseli to Hague, in a trial that is breaking all the records in terms of length of proceedings and has become a constant source of frustration for most Kosovars. In the recent few years, under Krasniqi’s leadership, PDK has joined ALDE group, actively embedding itself in the international network of liberal and centrist parties.

PDK has somewhat surprisingly nominated Bedri Hamza as candidate for Prime Minister. This is considered a shrewd decision. Hamza won mayorship of Mitrovica in 2021 in the first round, comprehensibly beating the incumbent VV candidate. Hamza is also a well-respected former Finance Minister in two governments and a former Central Bank Governor. Several independent journalists and civil society leaders have commended PDK for this move. Hamza is a well-liked and experienced technocrat and will be able to position itself as a credible and different candidate from the Kosovo’s pioneer of populism Albin Kurti.

PDK’s challenge will be to achieve its optimal voter turnout by getting the vote from the traditional strongholds in along the national axis from Mitrovica, via Prishtina and Ferizaj to Prizren. It’s a multipolar party so it’ll need both the KLA veteran vote, the urban voters, and to score well in more traditional and conservative towns and villages in southern and central Kosovo. Bedri Hamza in many ways covers all these bases well. The challenge will be to hone the messaging and build a credible narrative of an alternative to the VV rule.

LDK (2021 elections: 14 MP’s)

LDK lost dramatic number of votes in 2021 elections after an internal turmoil, caused by traumatic short-lived coalition with VV in 2020 which broke after Kurti refused to work with Trump administration on the Washington Agreement. LDK speaker of the parliament Vjosa Osmani subsequently left the party founded in 1991 by Ibrahim Rugova and the Kosovo generation of 1970s and 80s intellectuals, and joined Kurti in a winning coalition of 2021. LDK has since reformed itself and has chosen Lumir Abdixhiku as the new party head. He doesn’t have a history of belonging to party but rather joined it from the civil society. LDK has won capital of Prishtina and is well positioned to recuperate some of the losses.

Abdixhiku has had a free reign in organizing the party, the presidency and the campaign according to his own strategy but will be expected to be the biggest opposition party in the next elections. Anything less will not satisfy the party patricians, some of whom have been in LDK for over 30 years. LDK also has several mayors who are serving third or even fourth term and have very strong and loyal following. They will expect LDK to lead the future government, but PDK’s nomination of Bedri Hamza will have added some urgency in LDK plans to recuperate the enormous losses of 2021. LDK will need some 50 to 60,000 new votes for getting to the acceptable 23–25 MPs. Easier said than done.

AAK / NISMA (2021 results: AAK 8 MPs / NISMA was below the 5% threshold)

AAK is a smaller party founded by the former KLA commander for Dukagjin region Ramush Haradinaj, who also served two incomplete terms as a Prime minister. AAK is a party that hovered around 10% of the votes. It has a strong regional base in cities of Gjakova, Deçan, Peja. Recent polls were positioning the party at around 5% despite Haradinaj arguably being the most vocal opposition leader against Kurti. Last few months AAK signed a coalition agreement with NISMA, a small offshoot of PDK which also has a strong regional base and around 2–3% of votes. This has created a block that is most certainly expected to win enough votes for 8 to 12 mandates.

One of the crucial speculations in pre-electoral discussions is focused on AAK and its’ undisputed leader Ramush Haradinaj. In a scenario where neither VV nor the potential bilateral coalition PDK and LDK don’t have the majority for a government, where will AAK go, and what will it ask in return for its votes? It’s widely expected that Haradinaj may indeed ask for a future presidential position (mandate of Osmani ends in 2026) but is that possible? Haradinaj has declared he’ll never join a VV coalition, but politics is politics and post-election realism (or interest) is not same as pre-election belligerence.

Vetevendosje (2021 results: 58 MPS)

VV is a one-man party, a vehicle for fulfilling Albin Kurti’s grand vision. It’s a movement of meta-narratives. In the past, party was engaged in acts of violence, including throwing teargas in parliament, burning government vehicles and property (including private cars of ministers), collecting caches of weaponry, even shooting the Parliament building with rocket-propelled grenades. As such, it was not considered as an acceptable interlocutor for Western Embassies. The political program was also staunchly nationalist: VV didn’t recognize Kosovo anthem, Kosovo flag and it proclaimed ethnic Albania (incl territories of North Macedonia and Montenegro) to be the final political aim. Sometimes in 2019, VV decided to change tact. Its leaders started wearing ties, the party joined the Socialist International, and it reshaped its message, focusing on anti-corruption and economy. Its’ American campaign manager was a member of electoral campaign of Obama — and maybe more significantly: the former US Rep Tulsi Gabbard. VV motto was “ALL. FORWARD”. It was effective and multivocal and in the end VV it got all the votes it needed for governance without any need for coalition.

Kurti is now an incumbent leader, the longest serving PM since Hashim Thaçi. Anti-corruption and economy are not anymore on focus. It sometimes feels Kurti and VV are focused on three sole issues: Serbia, Serbia and Serbia. Party was certainly polling in mid 30’s in the summer of 2022, courtesy of several corruption scandals and the rapidly deteriorating relations with both US and EU. The terrorist attack in Banjska provided Kurti with silver lining. Since then, his discourse has refocused on issues of sovereignty, north Kosovo, security. He was aided by an opposition that was stunned by the events and had no clear strategic message on big ticket items such as ASMM and dialogue, relations with the West, but also the bread and butter issues of healthcare or education.

Kurti is now polling in low 40s. What are the key challenges for VV?

- Lower diaspora turnout as well as stronger investment by other parties on diaspora votes means VV may get smaller boost from outside Kosovo.

- Sluggish economy and lack of real flagship projects will also be used by opposition.

- Vjosa Osmani is not part of the ticket (sitting. President cant campaign and is constitutionally neutral of party politics), thus some of the breakaway LDK votes may return to the old fold.

- Kosovo’s diplomatic footprint has diminished to oblivion. Kurti is relatively isolated internationally. Other than an odd conference of Socialist International or multilateral forums, gone are the happy camping days of Kurti’s trips around Europe and US as the brave Balkan anti-Trump new kid on the block.

New crisis in north though will significantly boost his standing and Kurti has proven not to shie away from tactical escalations even if overall strategy doesn’t seem to have worked so good for Kosovo’s standing in the community of nations.

Current foreign affairs issues such as membership in Council of Europe or even visa liberalization are expected to have limited impact on peoples’ votes though if Kurti manages to raise the Kosovo flag in Strasbourg, it will provide him with a potent electoral image. If Kurti failes to join CoE after agreeing to. Implement court decisions regarding Deçani monastery, it will be one more argument for opposition to highlight his erratic and ineffective foreign policy.

One can be safe to assume Kurti will not make a move on ASMM or any substantive step from Ohrid agreement. He has been for decades a staunch opponent of Brussels formula and obviously prefers a status-quo for now. This makes him a perfect partner for Vucic who also prefers status-quo for now.

Diaspora

The 2021 landslide victory of VV was also helped by diaspora vote. Out of 56,000 postal votes, Kurti won 44,000. Another 15,000 may have come from diaspora who travelled to Kosovo to vote in person. Hundreds of organized buses and flights were managed by VV in 2021, triggering record participation of diaspora in elections. Other smaller countries with large diaspora, such as Ireland and Israel, have completely forbidden for non-resident diaspora to vote, but Kosovo allows for fairly easy voting procedure from anywhere in the world, in both national and local elections. Croatia has reserved seats for diaspora, but in Kosovo diaspora in 2021 has provided formidable number of votes, especially for VV to whom it brought another 8 MP’s with around 15% of overall votes cast.

The vote of diaspora in subsequent 2021 local elections fell dramatically. What will happen in the next elections? Experts say that the 2021 electoral tsunami will probably not be repeated. Firstly, the new elections law has created some additional steps for mail-in voters, including proving citizenship before voting. Secondly, opposition has been very active in establishing new party branches in Germany, Switzerland, France, Italy, Scandinavia, which may even out the terrain. In all likelihood, there will be less diaspora votes in 2024/25 cycle and while VV is expected to win big, the proportion of the vote may resemble more the voting pattern in Kosovo itself.

Polls

Polls are notoriously unreliable in Kosovo. One reason is that the representative sample is hard to design with a population that is constantly on the move from Kosovo to the West. Last three years, around 50,000 Kosovans have left Kosovo annually to work in Schengen zone. These difficulties notwithstanding, it was noted that VV had fell down to below 40% support in summer of 2023 after several corruption scandals as well as imposition of EU sanctions against Kurti. It’s also clear that after Banjska terrorist attack, VV’s support increased.

Kosovo Albanian parties fight for exactly 100 seats. 10 other seats are reserved for Serbs, and 10 others for minorities. Minorities usually “en bloc” join whoever has a governing majority, thus buttressing the numbers of whichever party or coalition has a majority in the parliament.

The recent polls have Kurti winning anywhere between 38 to 50 MPs (from 2021 result of record 59 MPs), while PDK (19 MPs in 2021) and LDK (14 MPs in 2021) are fighting for the second place and are usually within margin of error and will be fighting/hoping to achieve around or more than 25 MPs. Internal polling of both parties says they are well on the way to recuperate some lost ground. AAK has joined smaller NISMA in a coalition focused on passing the 5% threshold but it’s widely accepted that AAK/NISMA may have a position of kingmakers if PDK and LDK can’t form the government. Whether Haradinaj in that scenario joins VV or the fellow oppositionaires PDK and LDK may become the key question.

So what do oracles say?

Kurti will be the biggest party, but opposition has clear path to obtaining prime ministerial seat, just like in Poland or Spain, where the biggest party simply didnt have the biggest coalition potential. The election campaign will be dirty and VV is notoriously aggressive but voters are tired of politics.

The voter turnout for the parties will be essential.